Freedom of Thought Is Not a Performance: Public Law, Equality, and Ethical Judgment in Contested Civic Space

by The Panda Boy

INTRODUCTION

Freedom of thought and freedom of expression are foundational to the United Kingdom’s constitutional settlement. Their true test does not arise in abstract debate, but in moments of social strain—where grief, protest, identity, and state authority converge in contested civic space. In such moments, the role of law is not to arbitrate moral authenticity or emotional legitimacy, but to secure neutrality, proportionality, and equal treatment.

This article argues that both Torah (for the benefit of the people I am writing about) and public law converge on the same principle: justice depends on restraint, not reactivity. Where pain is externalised through accusation or force, authority becomes unsafe. Where conscience is regulated—whether individually or institutionally—justice remains possible.

I. Torah’s Jurisprudence of Restraint

The Torah draws a sharp distinction between two modes of response to pressure. In Bereishit

49, Jacob rebukes Reuben, Simeon, and Levi not for emotion, but for instability and anger that

turns outward (Genesis 49:3–7). Reuben is described as “unstable as water”; Simeon and Levi

are condemned for violence driven by wrath. The failing is not feeling, but unregulated reaction—pain externalised through force. The consequence is structural: loss of authority and

dispersion. The Torah’s judgment is jurisprudential rather than sentimental. Those who cannot govern reaction cannot safely be entrusted with power. By contrast, in Bereishit 48, Jacob elevates Ephraim and Manasseh, the sons of Joseph, raised entirely outside the covenantal home in Egypt. They grow up in a society that neither understands nor affirms their identity, yet they emerge with restraint, coherence, and moral clarity. Jacob crosses his hands deliberately, privileging inner maturity over primogeniture (Genesis 48:13–20). Their blessing is not one of dominance, but of regulated conscience.

This distinction is later distilled into two enduring axioms: “Shiviti Hashem le’negdi tamid”—constant inner orientation (Psalms 16:8), and “Da lifnei mi atah omeid”—accountability before authority (Pirkei Avot 2:1). Read jurisprudentially, these principles describe a mindset essential to legal practice: the ability to remain oriented to duty rather than impulse.

II. Trauma, Antisemitism, and Reactive Dissonance

The aftermath of violent antisemitic attacks—such as the Bondi Beach Chanukah massacre—has illustrated how easily grief can collapse into reactive dissonance: outrage cycles, narrative projection, and misdirected blame. In some public commentary, this extended to attempts to attribute responsibility for unrelated antisemitic attacks, including the Manchester Yom Kippur assault, to political office-holders. Such responses, however emotionally intelligible, undermine legal coherence. Pain does not entitle misattribution, and anger does not displace causation. From a professional standpoint, this distinction matters. Barristers are required to separate their emotional context from their legal responsibility, particularly when public accusations carry constitutional and reputational consequences.

Alongside this, a different response emerged. Individuals previously disengaged from public

Jewish identity reconnected through principled opposition to antisemitism—grounded not in

performative outrage, but in justice-based solidarity. This distinction mirrors the earlier ethical

contrast: reaction versus regulation.

III. Neurodivergence, Equality, and Non-Performative Expression

Modern institutions frequently invert this logic. Principled, rule-governed moral cognition—often present in neurodivergent individuals—is pathologised as rigidity or difficulty, while reactive volatility is excused as authenticity. Early clinical observations by Hans Asperger (1944), notwithstanding the moral complexity of his legacy, identified precisely this pattern: individuals marked by ethical consistency and intolerance of hypocrisy.

The Equality Act 2010 requires public authorities to avoid indirect discrimination and to have

due regard to advancing equality of opportunity (s.149). That duty extends beyond outcomes to process and perception. Penalising non-performative expression risks excluding those whose cognitive styles do not conform to dominant emotional scripts.

For the practising barrister, the relevance is immediate. Effective advocacy and ethical judgment require recognising when silence, restraint, or analysis reflects integrity rather than

disengagement.

IV. Parliament Square: Public Law Applied

These principles crystallised during a recent incident outside the Palace of Westminster. A pro-Palestinian protest was taking place on the pavement under the Westminster City Council jurisdiction. Later, a Chanukah gathering formed nearby, marking both the festival and the Bondi massacre. As attendance grew, participants moved onto Parliament Square—land governed by the Greater London Authority under the Greater London Authority Act 1999.

The Metropolitan Police response was operational rather than political. Roads were closed, resources scaled, and officers positioned to protect pedestrians. Powers to impose conditions on assemblies under the Public Order Act 1986, together with the common-law power to prevent an imminent breach of the peace, were available. They were not exercised.

This approach accords with settled authority: facilitation of peaceful assembly (DPP v Jones [1999] 2 AC 240), resistance to disproportionate pre-emptive suppression (R (Laporte) v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire [2006] UKHL 55), and protection of expression that “offends, shocks or disturbs” (Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737), as incorporated by the Human Rights Act 1998.

The policing was, if anything, sympathetic and compassionate. Those present could lawfully

have been required to move or disperse to prevent disorder. They were not.

V. Equality, Neutrality, and Misplaced Allegations

Some attendees expressed frustration that Parliament Square was not formally opened for the

gathering. That frustration misunderstands public-law constraints. Under the Equality Act 2010—particularly the Public Sector Equality Duty (s.149)—public authorities must act with political neutrality and consistency. Authorising exclusive use of GLA-controlled land for a gathering dominated by Israeli flags or antisemitism-focused messaging would engage a duty to consider equivalent access for Palestinian demonstrations.

Failure to do so could expose the GLA to judicial review for unequal treatment. This is not antisemitism. It is the ordinary operation of the law of equality. Conflating neutral governance with discrimination risks dilutes the legal meaning of antisemitism itself, weakening enforcement and safeguarding (cf. Home Office Hate Crime Guidance; IHRA Working Definition).

For the barrister, the lesson is clear: conceptual inflation corrodes legal credibility.

VI. Golders Green as a Comparator

The public menorah lighting at Golders Green station provides a useful comparator. That event was planned and coordinated in advance between the local authority, Transport for London, the Metropolitan Police, and the British Transport Police. Crowd management and transport access were anticipated. No impromptu road closures were required. The event proceeded safely and visibly.

This was public law functioning as intended: foresight, coordination, and proportionality. The contrast with Parliament Square is instructive, not accusatory. Where events escalate organically in highly sensitive civic space, the law responds through dynamic risk management.

Where events are organised and coordinated, Jewish public expression proceeds without

incident.

Order is not suppression. Planning is not capitulation.

VII. Conclusion: Professional Judgment Under Pressure

Chanukah commemorates light lit in darkness, not after darkness has passed. Jewish tradition cautions against becoming consumed by that darkness. Public law makes a parallel demand: clarity over accusation, equality over impulse, and proportionality over reaction.

For the aspiring barrister, the lesson is professional as much as moral. Advocacy, ethics, and judgment are tested not by certainty, but by restraint. Justice is sustained not by outrage, but by regulated conscience. Freedom endures only when thought is allowed to be disciplined rather than performative. That discipline—intellectual, ethical, and legal—is the hallmark of competent public-law practice.

Author’s Note

This article is written in a personal capacity and does not represent any organisation or

institution.